哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)-第6部分

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The　first　idea　that　presents　itself　in　speaking　of　means　is　that　of　something　external　to　the　object；
and　having　no　share　in　the　object　itself。　But　merely　natural　things　—　even　the　monest　lifeless
objects　—　used　as　means；　must　be　of　such　a　kind　as　adapts　them　to　their　purpose；　they　must
possess　something　in　mon　with　it。　Human　beings　least　of　all；　sustain　the　bare　external　relation
of　mere　means　to　the　great　ideal　aim。　Not　only　do　they　in　the　very　act　of　realising　it；　make　it　the
occasion　of　satisfying　personal　desires；　whose　purport　is　diverse　from　that　aim　—　but　they　share　in
that　ideal　aim　itself；　and　are　for　that　very　reason　objects　of　their　own　existence；　not　formally
merely；　as　the　world　of　living　beings　generally　is　—　whose　individual　life　is　essentially　subordinate
to　that　of　man；　and　is　properly　used　up　as　an　instrument。　Men；　on　the　contrary；　are　objects　of
existence　to　themselves；　as　regards　the　intrinsic　import　of　the　aim　in　question。　To　this　order
belongs　that　in　them　which　we　would　exclude　from　the　category　of　mere　means；　…　Morality；　Ethics；
Religion。　That　is　to　say；　man　is　an　object　of　existence　in　himself　only　in　virtue　of　the　Divine　that　is　in
him；　—　that　which　was　designated　at　the　outset　as　Reason；　which；　in　view　of　its　activity　and　power
of　self…determination；　was　called　Freedom。　And　we　affirm　—　without　entering　at　present　on　the
proof　of　the　assertion　…that　Religion；　Morality；　&c。　have　their　foundation　and　source　in　that
principle；　and　so　are　essentially　elevated　above　all　alien　necessity　and　chance。　And　here　we　must
remark　that　individuals；　to　the　extent　of　their　freedom；　are　responsible　for　the　depravation　and
enfeeblement　of　morals　and　religion。　This　is　the　seal　of　the　absolute　and　sublime　destiny　of　man　—
that　be　knows　what　is　good　and　what　is　evil；　that　his　destiny　is　his　very　ability　to　will　either　good　or
evil；　—　in　one　word；　that　he　is　the　subject　of　moral　imputation；　imputation　not　only　of　evil；　but　of
good；　and　not　only　concerning　this　or　that　particular　matters　and　all　that　happens　ab　extra；　but
also　the　good　and　evil　attaching　to　his　individual　freedom。　The　brute　alone　is　simply　innocent。　It
would；　however　demand　an　extensive　explanation　—　as　extensive　as　the　analysis　of　moral　freedom
itself　—　to　preclude　or　obviate　all　the　misunderstandings　which　the　statement　that　what　is　called
innocent　imports　the　entire　unconsciousness　of　evil　—　is　wont　to　occasion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　38

In　contemplating　the　fate　which　virtue；　morality；　even　piety　experience　in　history；　we　must　not　fall
into　the　Litany　of　Lamentations；　that　the　good　and　pious　often　—　or　for　the　most　part　—　fare　ill　in
the　world；　while　the　evil…disposed　and　wicked　prosper。　The　term　prosperity　is　used　in　a　variety　of
meanings　—　riches；　outward　honour；　and　the　like。　But　in　speaking　of　something　which　in　and　for
itself　constitutes　an　aim　of　existence；　that　so…called　well　or　ill…faring　of　these　or　those　isolated
individuals　cannot　be　regarded　as　an　essential　element　in　the　rational　order　of　the　universe。　With
more　justice　than　happiness　—　or　a　fortunate　environment　for　individuals；　—　it　is　demanded　of　the
grand　aim　of　the　world's　existence；　that　it　should　foster；　nay　involve　the　execution　and　ratification
of　good；　moral；　righteous　purposes。　What　makes　men　morally　discontented　（a　discontent；　by　the
bye；　on　which　they　somewhat　pride　themselves）；　is　that　they　do　not　find　the　present　adapted　to　the
realisation　of　aims　which　they　hold　to　be　right　and　just　（more　especially　in　modern　times；　ideals　of
political　constitutions）；　they　contrast　unfavourably　things　as　they　are；　with　their　idea　of　things　as
they　ought　to　be。　In　this　case　it　is　not　private　interest　nor　passion　that　desires　gratification；　but
Reason；　Justice；　Liberty；　and　equipped　with　this　title；　the　demand　in　question　assumes　a　lofty
bearing；　and　readily　adopts　a　position　not　merely　of　discontent；　but　of　open　revolt　against　the
actual　condition　of　the　world。　To　estimate　such　a　feeling　and　such　views　aright；　the　demands
insisted　upon；　and　the　very　dogmatic　opinions　asserted；　must　be　examined。　At　no　time　so　much　as
in　our　own；　have　such　general　principles　and　notions　been　advanced；　or　with　greater　assurance。　If
in　days　gone　by；　history　seems　to　present　itself　as　a　struggle　of　passions；　in　our　time　—　though
displays　of　passion　are　not　wanting　—　it　exhibits　partly　a　predominance　of　the　struggle　of　notions
assuming　the　authority　of　principles；　partly　that　of　passions　and　interests　essentially　subjective；　but
under　the　mask　of　such　higher　sanctions。　The　pretensions　thus　contended　for　as　legitimate　in　the
name　of　that　which　has　been　stated　as　the　ultimate　aim　of　Reason；　pass　accordingly；　for　absolute
aims；　—　to　the　same　extent　as　Religion；　Morals；　Ethics。　Nothing；　as　before　remarked；　is　now　more
mon　than　the　plaint　that　the　ideals　which　imagination　sets　up　are　not　realised　—　that　these
glorious　dreams　are　destroyed　by　cold　actuality。　These　Ideals　—　which　in　the　voyage　of　life
founder　on　the　rocks　of　hard　reality　—　may　be　in　the　first　instance　only　subjective；　and　belong　to
the　idiosyncrasy　of　the　individual；　imagining　himself　the　highest　and　wisest。　Such　do　not　properly
belong　to　this　category。　For　the　fancies　which　the　individual　in　his　isolation　indulges；　cannot　be　the
model　for　universal　reality；　just　as　universal　law　is　not　designed　for　the　units　of　the　mass。　These　as
such　may；　in　fact；　find　their　interests　decidedly　thrust　into　the　background。　But　by　the　term
“Ideal；”　we　also　understand　the　ideal　of　Reason；　of　the　Good；　of　the　True。　Poets；　as　e。g。
Schiller；　have　painted　such　ideals　touchingly　and　with　strong　emotion；　and　with　the　deeply
melancholy　conviction　that　they　could　not　be　realised。　In　affirming；　on　the　contrary　that　the
Universal　Reason　does　realise　itself；　we　leave　indeed　nothing　to　do　with　the　individual　empirically
regarded。　That　admits　of　degrees　of　better　and　worse；　since　here　chance　and　speciality　have
received　authority　from　the　Idea　to　exercise　their　monstrous　power。　Much；　therefore；　in　particular
aspects　of　the　grand　phenomenon　might　be　found　fault　with。　This　subjective　fault…finding；　—　which；
however；　only　keeps　in　view　the　individual　and　its　deficiency；　without　taking　notice　of　Reason
pervading　the　whole；　—　is　easy；　and　inasmuch　as　it　asserts　an　excellent　intention　with　regard　to　the
good　of　the　whole；　and　seems　to　result　from　a　kindly　heart；　it　feels　authorised　to　give　itself　airs　and
assume　great　consequence。　It　is　easier　to　discover　a　deficiency　in　individuals；　in　states；　and　in
Providence；　than　to　see　their　real　import　and　value。　For　in　this　merely　negative　fault…finding　a
proud　position　is　taken；　—　one　which　overlooks　the　object；　without　having　entered　into　it；　—
without　having　prehended　its　positive　aspect。　Age　generally　makes　men　more　tolerant；　youth　is
always　discontented。　The　tolerance　of　age　is　the　result　of　the　ripeness　of　a　judgment　which；　…　not
merely　as　the　result　of　indifference；　is　satisfied　even　with　what　is　inferior；　but；　more　deeply　taught
by　the　grave　experience　of　life；　has　been　led　to　perceive　the　substantial；　solid　worth　of　the　object
in　question。　The　insight　then　to　which　—　in　contradistinction　from　those　ideals　—　philosophy　is　to
lead　us；　is；　that　the　real　world　is　as　it　ought　to　be　—　that　the　truly　good　—　the　universal　divine
reason　—　is　not　a　mere　abstraction；　but　a　vital　principle　capable　of　realising　itself。　This　Good；　this
Reason；　in　its　most　concrete　form；　is　God。　God　governs　the　world；　the　actual　working　of　his
government　—　the　carrying　out　of　his　plan　—　is　the　History　of　the　World。　This　plan　philosophy
strives　to　prehend；　for　only　that　which　has　been　developed　as　the　result　of　it；　possesses　bona
fide　reality。　That　which　does　not　accord　with　it；　is　negative；　worthless　existence。　Before　the　pure
light　of　this　divine　Idea　—　which　is　no　mere　Idea　…　the　phantom　of　a　world　whose　events　are　an
incoherent　concourse　of　fortuitous　circumstances；　utterly　vanishes。　Philosophy　wishes　to　discover
the　substantial　purport；　the　real　side　of　the　divine　idea　and　to　justify　the　so　much　despised　Reality
of　things；　for　Reason　is　the　prehension　of　the　Divine　work。　But　as　to　what　concerns　the
perversion；　corruption；　and　ruin　of　religious；　ethical　and　moral　purposes；　and　states　of　society
generally；　it　must　be　affirmed；　that　in　their　essence　these　are　infinite　and　eternal；　but　that　the　forms
they　assume　may　be　of　a　limited　orders　and　consequently　belong　to　the　domain　of　mere　nature；
and　be　subject　to　the　sway　of　chance。　They　are　therefore　perishable；　and　exposed　to　decay　and
corruption。　Religion　and　morality　—　in　the　same　way　as　inherently　universal　essences　—　have　the
peculiarity　of　being　present　in　the　individual　soul；　in　the　full　extent　of　their　Idea；　and　therefore　truly
and　really；　although　they　may　not　manifest　themselves　in　it　in　extenso；　and　are　not　applied　to　fully
developed　relations。　The　religion；　the　morality　of　a　limited　sphere　of　life　—　that　of　a　shepherd　or　a
peasant；　e。g。　—　in　its　intensive　concentration　and　limitation　to　a　few　perfectly　simple　relations　of
life；　—　has　infinite　worth；　the　same　worth　as　the　religion　and　morality　of　extensive　knowledge；　and
of　an　existence　rich　in　the　pass　of　its　relations　and　actions。　This　inner　focus　—　this　simple
region　of　the　claims　of　subjective　freedom；　—　the　home　of　volition；　resolution；　and　action；　—　the
abstract　sphere　of　conscience；　—　that　which　prises　the　responsibility　and　moral　value　of　the
individual；　remains　untouched；　and　is　quite　shut　out　from　the　noisy　din　of　the　World's　History　—
including　not　merely　external　and　temporal　changes；　but　also　those　entailed　by　the　absolute
necessity　inseparable　from　the　realisation　of　the　Idea　of　Freedom　itself。　But　as　a　general　truth　this
must　be　regarded　as　settled；　that　whatever　in　the　world　possesses　claims　as　noble　and　glorious；
has　nevertheless　a　higher　existence　above　it。　The　claim　of　the　World…Spirit　rises　above　all　special
claims。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　39

These　observations　may　suffice　in　reference　to　the　means　which　the　World…Spirit　uses　for　realising
its　Idea。　Stated　simply　and　abstractly；　this　mediation　involves　the　activity　of　personal　existences　in
whom　Reason　is　present　as　their　absolute　substantial　being；　but　a　basis；　in　the　first　instance；　still
obscure　and　unknown　to　them。　But　the　subject　bees　more　plicated　and　difficult　when　we
regard　individuals　not　merely　in　their　aspect　of　activity；　but　more　concretely；　in　conjunction　with　a
particular　manifestation　of　that　activity　in　their　religion　and　morality；　—　forms　of　existence　which　are
intimately　connected　with　Reason；　and　share　in　its　absolute　claims。　Here　the　relation　of　mere
means　of　an　end　disappears；　and　the　chief　hearings　of　this　seeming　difficulty　in　reference　to　the
absolute　aim　of　Spirit；　have　been　briefly　considered。　




III。　Philosophic　History
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ii。　The　Essential　Destiny　of　Reason

　　　　　　　　（3）　The　Embodiment　Spirit　Assumes　—　the　State

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　40

The　third　point　to　be　analysed　is；　therefore　…　what　is　the　object　to　be　realised　by　these　means；　i。e。
what　is　the　form　it　assumes　in　the　realm　of　reality。　We　have　spoken　of　means；　but　in　the　carrying
out　of　a　subjective；　limited　aim；　we　have　also　to　take　into　consideration　the　element　of　a　material；
either　already　present　or　which　has　to　be　procured。　Thus　the　question　would　arise：　What　is　the
material　in　which　the　Ideal　of　Reason　is　wrought　out？　The　primary　answer　would　be；　…　Personality
itself　…　human　desires　…　Subjectivity　generally。　In　human　knowledge　and　volition；　as　its　material
element；　Reason　attains　positive　existence。　We　have　considered　subjective　volition　where　it　has　an
object　which　is　the　truth　and　essence　of　a　reality；　viz。　where　it　constitutes　a　great　world…historical
passion。　As　a　subjective　will；　occupied　with　limited　passions；　it　is　dependent；　and　can　gratify　its
desires　only　within　the　limits　of　this　dependence。　But　the　subjective　will　has　also　a　substantial　life　…
a　reality；　…　in　which　it　moves　in　the　region　of　essential　being　and　has　the　essential　itself　as　the
object　of　its　existence。　This　essential　being　is　the　union　of　the　subjective　with　the　rational　Will：　it
is　the　moral　Whole；　the　State；　which　is　that　form　of　reality　in　which　the　individual　has　and　enjoys
his　freedom；　but　on　the　condition　of　his　recognition；　believing　in　and　willing　that　which　is　mon
to　the　Whole。　And　this　must　not　be　understood　as　if　the　subjective　will　of　the　social　unit　attained　its
gratification　and　enjoyment　through　that　mon　Will；　as　if　this　were　a　means　provided　for　its
benefit；　as　if　the　individual；　in　his　relations　to　other　individuals；　thus　limited　his　freedom；　in　order
that　this　universal　limitation　…　the　mutual　constraint　of　all　…　might　secure　a　small　space　of　liberty　for
each。　Rather；　we　affirm；　are　Law；　Morality；　Government；　and　they　alone；　the　positive　reality　and
pletion　of　Freedom。　Freedom　of　a　low　and　limited　order；　is　mere　caprice；　which　finds　its
exercise　in　the　sphere　of　particular　and　limited　desires。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　41

Subjective　volition　…　Passion　…　is　that　which　sets　men　in　activity；　that　which　effects　〃practical〃
realisation。　The　Idea　is　the　inner　spring　of　action；　the　State　is　the　actually；　existing；　realised　moral
life。　For　it　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal；　essential　Will；　with　that　of　the　individual；　and　this　is
〃Morality。〃　The　Individual　living　in　this　unity　has　a　moral　life；　possesses　a　value　that　consists　in　this
substantiality　alone。　Sophocles　in　his　Antigone；　says；　〃The　divine　mands　are　not　of　yesterday；
nor　of　today；　no；　they　have　an　infinite　existence；　and　no　one　could　say　whence　they　came。〃　The
laws　of　morality　are　not　accidental；　but　are　the　essentially　Rational。　It　is　the　very　object　of　the
State　that　what　is　essential　in　the　practical　activity　of　men；　and　in　their　dispositions；　should　be　duly
recognised；　that　it　should　have　a　manifest　existence；　and　maintain　its　position。　It　is　the　absolute
interest　of　Reason　that　this　moral　Whole　should　exist；　and　herein　lies　the　justification　and　merit　of
heroes　who　have　founded　states；　…　however　rude　these　may　have　been。　In　the　history　of　the
World。；　only　those　peoples　can　e　under　our　notice　which　form　a　state。　For　it　must　be
understood　that　this　latter　is　the　realisation　of　Freedom；　i。e。　of　the　absolute　final　aim；　and　that　it
exists　for　its　own　sake。　It　must　further　be　understood　that　all　the　worth　which　the　human　being
possesses　…　all　spiritual　reality；　he　possesses　only　through　the　State。　For　his　spiritual　reality　consists
in　this；　that　his　own　essence　…　Reason　…　is　objectively　present　to　him；　that　it　possesses　objective
immediate　existence　for　him。　Thus　only　is　he　fully　conscious；　thus　only　is　he　a　partaker　of　morality　…
of　a　just　and　moral　social　and　political　life。　For　Truth　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal　and　subjective
Will；　and　the　Universal　is　to　be　found　in　the　State；　in　its　laws；　its　universal　and　rational
arrangements。　The　State　is　the　Divine　Idea　as　it　exists　on　Earth。　We　have　in　it；　therefore；　the
object　of　History　in　a　more　definite　shape　than　before；　that　in　which　Freedom　obtains　objectivity；
and　lives　in　the　enjoyment　of　this　objectivity。　For　Law　is　the　objectivity　of　Spirit；　volition　in　its　true
form。　Only　that　will　which　obeys　law；　is　free；　for　it　obeys　itself　…　it　is　independent　and　so　free。
When　the　State　or　our　country　constitutes　a　munity　of　existence；　when　the　subjective　will　of
man　submits　to　laws；　…　the　contradiction　between　Liberty　and　Necessity　vanishes。　The　Rational
has　necessary　existence　as　being　the　reality　and　substance　of　things；　and　we　are　free　in　recognising
it　as　law；　and　following　it　as　the　substance　of　our　own　being。　The　objective　and　the　subjective　will
are　then　reconciled；　and　present　one　identical　homogeneous　whole。　For　the　morality　（Sittlichkeit）
of　the　State　is　not　of　that　ethical　（moralische）　reflective　kind；　in　which　one's　own　conviction　bears
sway；　this　latter　is　rather　the　peculiarity　of　the　modern　time；　orality　is　based
on　the　principle　of　abiding　by　one's　duty　＇to　the　state　at　large＇。　An　Athenian　citizen　did　what　was
required　of　him；　as　it　were　from　instinct；　but　if　I　reflect　on　the　object　of　nay　activity；　I　must　have
the　consciousness　that　my　will　has　been　called　into　exercise。　But　morality　is　Duty　…　substantial
Right　…　a　〃second　nature〃　as　it　has　been　justly　called；　for　the　first　nature　of　man　is　his　primary
merely　animal　existence。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　42

The　development　in　extenso　of　the　Idea　of　the　State　belongs　to　the　Philosophy　of　Right；　but　it
must　be　observed　that　in　the　theories　of　our　time　various　errors　are　current　respecting　it；　which
pass　for　established　truths；　and　have　bee　fixed　prejudices。　We　will　mention　only　a　few　of
them；　giving　prominence　to　such　as　have　a　reference　to　the　object　of　our　history。　The　error　which
first　meets　us　is　the　direct　contradictory　of　our　principle　that　the　state　presents　the　realisation　of
Freedom；　the　opinion；　viz。；　that　man　is　free　by　nature；　but　that　in　society；　in　the　State　…　to　which
nevertheless　he　is　irresistibly　impelled　…　he　must　limit　this　natural　freedom。　That　man　is　free　by
Nature　is　quite　correct　in　one　sense；　viz。；　that　he　is　so　according　to　the　Idea　of　Humanity；　but　we
imply　thereby　that　lie　is　such　only　in　virtue　of　his　destiny　…　that　he　has　an　undeveloped　power　to
bee　such；　for　the　〃Nature〃　of　an　object　is　exactly　synonymous　with　its　〃Idea。〃　But　the　view　in
question　imports　more　than　this。　When　man　is　spoken　of　as　〃free　by　Nature；〃　the　mode　of　his
existence　as　well　as　his　destiny　is　implied。　His　merely　natural　and　primary　condition　is　intended。　In
this　sense　a　〃state　of　Nature〃　is　assumed　in　which　mankind　at　large　are　in　the　possession　of　their
natural　rights　with　the　unconstrained　exercise　and　enjoyment　of　their　freedom。　This　assumption　is
not　indeed　raised　to　the　dignity　of　the　historical　fact；　it　would　indeed　be　difficult；　were　the　attempt
seriously　made；　to　point　out　any　such　condition　as　actually　existing；　or　as　having　ever　occurred。
Examples　of　a　savage　state　of　life　can　be　pointed　out；　but　they　are　marked　by　brutal　passions　and
deeds　of　violence；　while；　however　rude　and　simple　their　conditions；　they　involve　social
arrangements　which　（to　use　the　mon　phrase）　restrain　freedom。　That　assumption　is　one　of
those　nebulous　images　which　theory　produces；　an　idea　which　it　cannot　avoid　originating；　but　which
it　fathers　upon　real　existence；　without　sufficient　historical　justification。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　43

What　we　find　such　a　state　of　Nature　to　be　in　actual　experience；　answers　exactly　to　the　Idea　of　a
merely　natural　condition。　Freedom　as　the　ideal　of　that　which　is　original　and　natural；　does　not　exist
as　original　and　natural。　Rather　must　it　be　first　sought　out　and　won；　and　that　by　an　incalculable
medial　discipline　of　the　intellectual　and　moral　powers。　The　state　of　Nature　is；　therefore；
predominantly　that　of　injustice　and　violence；　of　untamed　natural　impulses；　of　inhuman　deeds　and
feelings。　Limitation　is　certainty　produced　by　Society　and　the　State；　but　it　is　a　limitation　of　the　mere
brute　emotions　and　rude　instincts；　as　a